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From	Djakarta

cleverly utilized dissatisfied South Vietnamese so as to present the struggle as a mass-inspired uprising rather than what he recognized as an externally supported guerrilla action. On a somewhat different passect of the same subject, an officer of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs during a recent visit inquired of Max Maramis, the Head of the American Affairs Division of the Foreign Affairs Department, what could be expected in Indonesia should a Communist government take over on the Southeast Asian mainland during the next decade. The official responded frankly and unhesitatingly that "by then Indonesia would be Communist of course." It was clear that he considered resistance would evaporate long before Indonesia was physically threatened by nearby Communist states. A somewhat similar answer was given to the visitor by Brigadier General A. J. Mokoginta, the General Deputy of the Department of National Security (the equivalent of a Secretary-General).

Convictions such as those outlined above demonstrate that, whatever line Indonesians may take in public, at least some informed observers among them privately welcome the United States presence in Southeast Asia and would be deeply concerned at any signs of a deterioration in Free World determination and ability to resist Chinese Communist encroachment in this area. There are few who would say so publicly, however, except for some opposition politicians who have nothing to lose. Nevertheless, the importance of preserving the American presence in this area is readily suggested by the intermed of Maramis and Mokoginta that a trend in favor of the Chinese Communists would spur many Indonesians rapidly down the road to an accommodation with Communism.

For the Ambassador:


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 Saigon, Taipei, Hong Kong.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

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40-48 Control: 2112 Action January 5, 1962 Rec'd: FE 3:35 a.m. FROM: Canberra Info SS TO: Secretary of State SR G NO: 335, January 5, 5 P.M. ŠP SO EUR NIACT IO P USIA NSC INR CIA NSA OSD ACTION DEPARTMENT 335; INFORMATION DJAKARTA 19, THE HAGUE 15, LONDON 17, CINCPAC UNNUMBERED Embassy telegram 328. 66675/3 Tange has asked that question posed under fourth point of referenced telegram be rephrased and amplified as follows: ARMY NAVY AIR "What action, including military action, would US take if Indonesia resorted to use of force against WNG, whether on RMR large or small scale?" BELTON RM/R Ľ, 8

SECRET

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Authority WD 94957C
By D NARA Date 8/4/0

CONFIDENTIAL

-2- 1195, JANUARY 9, 1 PM FROM DJAKARTA

IN THIS GESTURE --- INDEED, IN INTRODUCING MEMBERS OF CORPS, SUKARNO INVARIABLY DOES SO IN INTRODUCTORY REMARKS, POINTING OUT HOW INDONESIA HAS BECOME WORLD NATION RECOGNIZED BY OTHER LEADING NATIONS, REPRESENTATIVES OF WHICH ARE PRESENT ON THIS OCCASION. ALTHOUGH OCCASION FESTIVE, ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH DIPLOMATS ARE PRESENTED IS ONE OF GOOD NATURE, CORDIALITY AND DIGNITY. IT WOULD BE CROTESQUE IF NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT MADE AN ISSUE OVER WHAT WAS IN FACT MERE BESTURE OF COURTESY.

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By NARA Date 8/4/00

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ACTION: Amembassy DJAKARTA 769	22.11 02
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approached by Indonesian Navy with request that U.	S. Navy obtain INDO and Dutch
names of survivors recent naval encounter between	INDO and Dutch
forces. Believe U.S. interests best served by sug	
seek information through International Red Cross w	hich traditional
channel for such purposes.	`
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By NARA Date 8/4/00

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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JAN 22 5 30 PH '62

ACTION: Amembassy DJAKARTA Amembassy MANILA for FELG Ameonsul SINGAPORE

INFO:

Amembassy CANBERRA CINCPAC/POLAD Honolule

Department believes feeling against U.S. likely to run high in event West New Guinea dispute taken to Security Council under circumstances in which it would be necessary for us to state strong position against Indonesians. In view probability civil disturbances directed against Americans, would appreciate your recommendations re evacuation if it appears certain matter will be taken up by Security Council. In such circumstances Department believes that for planning purposes it might transport to actual Security Council discussion.

If you decide advance evacuation dependents and non-essential personnel advisable, can you phase out by existing commercial transportation or will you require additional lift? If latter, inform Department and FELG requirements per DEPTEL 763 RPTD Singapore 215, Manila 761. Singapore comment on number Ballevacuees can be provided safehaven. Manila comment on faci as alternate safehaven or for overflow,

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FORM DS-322

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INCOMING	TELEGRAM

Department of State [MININ SHIP!] PERMANENT RECORD COPY

SECRET 35 Control: 16216 Action Rec'd: January 275 1962 9:49 am FΈ FROM: DJAKARTA Info Secretary of State SS SR NO: 1306, JANUARY 26, 3 PM G SP T. ACTION DEPARTMENT 1306, INFORMATION CINCPAC 220, CANBERRA 126, EHR CINCPAC POLAD UNNUMBERED. PR IOP CANBERRAIS 375 TO DEPARTMENT INR SUBANDRIO TOLD ME YESTERDAY THAT SUKARNO HAD REPORTS RMR OF SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES BY AUSTRALIAN AND US REPRESENTATIVES, AND THAT WHILE FOREIGN MINISTER DID NOT TAKE THEM SERIOUSLY, HE THOUGHT I SHOULD BE INFORMED. HE DID NOT MENTION SUSPICION WE OR AUSTRAL!ANS WERE INVOLVED IN PLOTS AGAINST SUKARNO'S LIFE EXCEPT BY IMPLICATION BUT SPECIFICALLY REFEREED TO MILTAG AND MILITARY ATTACHES ACTIVITIES. HE SAID PRESIDENT HAD RAISED QUESTION AS TO WHETHER TOO INQUISITIVE MILITARY ATTACHES OUGHT NOT TO BE SENT HOME, WAS PARTICULARLY UPSET ABOUT QUERIES RE LOCATION AURI AIRCRAFT AND EXTENT OF SOVIET SUPPLIED EQUIPMENT. I POOH POOHED WHOLE BUSINESS EXCEPT TO INDICATE THIS KIND OF REPORT OBVIOUSLY HEPTRED BY LEFTIST ELEMENTS, TOLD SUBANDRIO HE COULD TELL PRESIDENT I REGARDED ACTIVITIES OF MILITARY ATTACHES HELPFUL TO GOI AS WELL AS TO US. OBVIOUSLY WE WERE INTERESTED IN EXTENT OF GOI INVOLVEMENT WITH SOVIET BLOC AND IT WAS TO GOI INTEREST THAT WE HAVE FACTS IN ORDER REACH JUDGMENT AS TOGETHER GOT REACHING DANGER POINT. AS FOR MILTAG, THIS WAS STRICTLY MILITARY AID, NOT INTELLIGENCE GATHERING OPERATION. 무 77.77 SUBANDRIO SAID HE HAD TOLD PRESIDENT"THIS WAS WHAT MILITARY ATTACHES WERE FOR" AND ENDEAVORED TO CALM SUKARNO DOWN, POINTING OUT INDO ATTACHES WERE DOING SAME THING IN OTHER COUNTRIES. IF GOI SENT AUSTRALIAN OR US
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
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Authority 1410 949570
By 60 NARA Date 8/4/00

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February 8,1962

FE PAR

Dear Senator Dirksen:

I refer to your letter of January 29, 1962 with which you enclosed a letter from Mr. William J. McGill, Sr. of Flossmoor, Illinois.
Mr. McGill wrote concerning United States Ambassador Jones in Djakarta and the West New Guinea situation.

In Indonesia, as in some other countries, it is customary for the Chief of State to invite the diplomatic representatives of foreign nations to accompany him on his tours about the country. Ambassador Jones has been invited to join President Sukarno in such travels on several occasions and has participated with the approval of the Department. It would, of course, be difficult for him to refuse such an invitation. The tours provide an excellent opportunity for Ambassador Jones to visit remote areas of the country and to gauge attitudes of the people. They also afford the Ambassador useful occasions for talks with the President. It is understood by all concerned, however, that the presence of the Ambassador connotes neither approval nor disapproval of speeches made during the course of the travels. I should like to add that Ambassador Jones enjoys the full confidence of the Department.

The West New Guinea dispute stems from the time Indonesia achieved independence from The Netherlands in 1949. At that time, the two countries were unable to agree regarding the disposition of that territory which had previously been included in the Netherlands East Indies. As part of the independence settlement, however, the parties agreed to further negotiations concerning the territory within a period of one year. Although these and other negotiations were subsequently held, the parties have been unable to reach a solution to the dispute. The Netherlands has clearly indicated that it desires to end its administration of the territory in a manner designed to insure that the interests of the inhabitants be safeguarded. Indonesia claims, on the other hand, that the territory is part of Indonesia claims, on the other hand, that the territory is part of Indonesia and that Indonesia's independence is incomplete while the territory is held by a foreign power. Indonesia has been careful to note that it has no claims on the eastern part of New Guines, governed by Australia nor for Portuguese or British administered territories adjacent to Indonesia.

For our

The Honorable

Everett McKinley Dirksen,
United States Senate.

(D) 2/9/67 FE! SPA! JA Linekan

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority WND 94957C
By NARA Date 8/4/0

For our part, we have made it quite clear that the United States opposes military action in settlement of such disputes and, in addition, we have been making every effort to encourage the disputants to reach an acceptable non-violent solution to the problem. We strongly support the current efforts being made by the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations to bring the two parties together for negotiations.

Respectfully,

Frederick G. Dutton Assistant Secretary

Enclosure:

Letter from constituent.

Clearances:

FE:SPA: JALinehan: aoa 2/2/62

Everett McKinley Dirksen Illinois

> United States Senate Minority Leader

ACTION is assigned to

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January 29, 1962

The Honorable Frederick G. Dutton Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations Department of State Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Dutton:

I would appreciate any information or comments you might have relating to the situation discussed in the attached letter from Mr. W. J. McGill, 2539 Brassie Avenue, Flossmoor, Illinois. Please return his letter with your reply.

Sincerely.

Frencht McKinley Dirksen

The target of the state.

Letter and enclosures, if any microfilmed by RM/R

31-30-62

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority 1400 949570
By 100 NARA Date 8/4/00

William J. McGill, Sr. 2539 Brassie Avenue Flossmoor, Illinois P.O. Box 113

January 9, 1962

The Honorable Everett M. Dirksen Washington, D. C.

Dear Senator:

According to lcurrent news despatches from Indonesia, our Ambassador there is a fool as well as a clown. Not content with traveling around the country with that ineffable character Soekarno and his dog and pony show Mr. Jones actually has become a part of the act. Perhaps you could suggest to the State Department that Mr. Jones could be called home and replaced with aignity someone who could represent this country with dignity. If the State Department knows what is eventually at stake in the situation Soekarno is trying to whip up in New Guinea they would long ago have told their people to tell Soekarno that he will find us on the side of the Dutch and the Australians and perhaps a little ahead of them if he tries any forcible takeover of Dutch New Guinea. Certainly a little display of force on our part has no risk in this instance, and is the only argument he can understand.

No doubt Soekarno has been using Shell, Caltex, Stanyac, Pan American Airlines and any other western business interests in Indonesia to try have them put pressure on their governments to close their eyes to the real dangers of the situation under threat of retaliation to their Indonesian interests but in the long run he will expropriate their properties anyway so they have nothing to gain. Obviously if Soekarno is allowed to get away with this grab either by force or by negotiation, he will then use the same tactics on the Australians for their half of the island and as a practical matter this would be harder to stop by a show of force. There has been a lot of talk about Goa but actually this New Guinea putsch is much more important to us.


The whole situation including the total absence of understanding by Mr. Jones of his proper attitude as a representative of you and me and millions of other Americans is really a prime example of what is wrong with our foreign policy and some of the cast of characters who represent us.

As a matter of fact if most of our people really knew the facts about Soekarno, both his public and private life, and what has really happened in Indonesia, there might for once, be enough heat generated to get something constructive done. But them Indonesia is a long way from here.

My only purpose in writing you is because I think some strong representations on your part would add considerably to your reputation as usually being on the side of the angels.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ W. J. McGill



February 9,1962

Dear Senator Snathers

I refer to your letter of Jammary 31, 1742 enclosing Riss Dorothy Ronjamin's letter requesting information on our policy towards Indonesia and Yest How Outhon and any differences which we may have with the Methorlands concerning this policy.

At the obtainment of Indonesian independence in 19/9, the Botherlands and Indonesia ware unable to resolve the problem of the future status of best him duines which had been administered as a part of the Botherlands East Indios. They did agree, heaver, to majoritate further during the next year. Although those and other negotiations took place, agreement was not reached; and the Dutch continued to administer the area. They have clearly indicated, however, that they desire the end their administration of the territory in a namer designed to safeguard the interests of the inhabitance. Indunesia, on the other hand, claims that the territory is rightfully Indensition and that Indunesia's independence is incomplete while

Throughout this dispute, the United States has attempted to maintain an impartial attitude and to unter both parties to reach a peaceful, makelly—agreed solution. We are now giving full support to the efforts of the Socretary Conoral at the United Hations to brin; about a negotiated settlement, which would be in the interests of all concerned.

I hope that this information will be of assistance in univing to your constituent's letter.

Simoerely yours,

Prederick Q. Datte

The Honorable George A. Snathers,

Dale McCrossollelos

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SPA - Mr. Linisha

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Department in some

DECLASSIFIED
Authority WD 94957C
By NARA Date 8/4/0

Dear Senator Smathers:

I refer to your letter of January 31, 1962 enclosing Miss Dorothy Benjamin's letter requesting information on our policy towards Indonesia and West New Guinea and any differences which we may have with the Netherlands concerning this policy.

At the obtainment of Indonesian independence in 1949, the Netherlands and Indonesia were unable to resolve the problem of the future status of West New Guinea which had been administered as a part of the Netherlands East Indies. They did agree, however, to negotiate further during the next year. Although those and other negotiations took place, agreement was not reached; and the Dutch continued to administer the area. They have clearly indicated, however, that they desire to end their administration of the territory in manner designed to safeguard the interests of the inhabitants. Indonesia, on the other hand, claims that the territory is rightfully Indonesian and that Indonesia's independence is incomplete while the territory is held by a foreign power.

Throughout this dispute, the United States has attempted to maintain an impartial attitude and to urge both parties to reach a peaceful, mutually-agreed solution. We are now giving full support to the efforts of the Secretary General of the United Nations to bring about a negotiated settlement, which would be in the interests of all concerned.

I hope that this information will be of assistance in replying to your constituent's letter.

Sincerely yours,

Frederick G. Dutton Assistant Secretary

The Honorable

George A. Smathers, United States Senate.

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Authority WND 9457C
By NARA Date 8/4/00

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

January 31, 1962

Congressional Liaison Offices Department of State Washington, D. C.

Dear Sirs:

I am enclosing herewith a letter from Miss Dorothy Benjamin, 401 Sunburst Court, Clearwater, Florida, requesting information with respect to the U. S.policy toward Indonesia and New Guinea, and the difference between such policy and that of the Netherlands.

It will be appreciated if you will furnish me with information upon which to predicate a reply to Miss Benjamin -- with the return of her letter for my files.

GAS:0'K/f

Enclosure (it)

GEORGE United States Senator

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12-5-62

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